

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
AMARILLO DIVISION

EDDIE CHARLEY ROBINSON,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM STEPHENS,  
Director, Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice  
Correctional Institutions Division,

Respondent.

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2:14-CV-011

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Petitioner has filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging disciplinary proceeding 20140030268, which occurred on October 2, 2013, and which resulted in the loss of 210 days of good-time credit. The proceeding took place at the Clements Unit in Potter County, Texas. As of the date the instant habeas application was filed, petitioner remained incarcerated at the Clements Unit pursuant to a March 7, 2002 conviction for the offense of aggravated robbery out of Gregg County, Texas. *See State v. Robinson*, No. 28561-B.

In order to challenge a prison disciplinary adjudication by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must, at a minimum, be eligible for mandatory supervised release and have received a punishment sanction which included forfeiture of previously accrued good time credits. *See Malchi v. Thaler*, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000). In his habeas application, petitioner acknowledges that his original conviction did include a deadly weapon finding but avers he is eligible for mandatory supervised release. A review of the Offender Information Detail maintained by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, confirms petitioner is incarcerated on one, twenty-year conviction for aggravated

robbery. A prisoner who, after 1996, committed the offense of aggravated robbery is not eligible for mandatory supervised release. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 508.149(a)(12); Act of June 1, 1995, 74<sup>th</sup> Leg., R.S., ch. 263 § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2592. Even though petitioner lost previously earned good-time credit as a result of the disciplinary proceeding, as petitioner is not eligible for mandatory supervised release, he cannot challenge the adjudication by way of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. *See Malchi*, 211 F.3d at 958.

#### RECOMMENDATION

It is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner EDDIE CHARLEY ROBINSON be DENIED.

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE

The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

ENTERED this 23RD day of January, 2014.

  
CLINTON E. AVERITTE  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**\* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT \***

Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). **Any objections must be filed on or before the fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed** as indicated by the “entered” date. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the Report and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A party’s failure to timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in this report shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge in this report and accepted by the district court. *See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), *superseded by statute on other grounds*, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), *as recognized in ACS Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin*, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); *Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).